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THE FUTURE OF SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

Donald S. Zagoria

ENOUGH HAS NOW been written to demonstrate that a real and fundamental Sino-Soviet conflict exists. The purpose of this brief article is to put the conflict in the perspective which the author deems necessary both properly to evaluate the present and to hazard some predictions about the future.

The basic and chronic dilemma of the international communist movement is its inability to bridge the gulf between the imperatives of an international revolutionary movement and those of any given national revolutionary movement, particularly after this movement has assumed state power. Conflicts inevitably arise. In the adaptation of general Marxist-Leninist principles to the particular tasks of building a communist society in any given country, there develops what Brzezinski aptly calls "domesticism," the tendency to emphasize domestic communist objectives and interests at the expense of broader, international Soviet goals and to view the interests and priorities of the international movement largely in terms of national or sectional problems.[1]

In 1956, because Gomulka was faced with problems peculiar to Poland, and not because he was a "disloyal" or "national" communist, he invented novel "right-wing" solutions and came into conflict with Moscow. In 1958, because Mao was faced with difficulties in food production, dwindling food reserves and mounting disaffection among the peasantry and rural cadres, and not because he was "irrational," he abandoned the Soviet cooperative model and invented the left-wing commune. This decision inevitably created conflict with Moscow, conflict which became more intense after the Chinese strongly implied that the communes were suitable for all underdeveloped countries building socialism. This latter contention was a product of regional "domesticism," i.e., a belief that the problems of building socialism in backward countries with predominantly feudal traditions and large peasantries is quite different from those encountered in Europe.

The same phenomenon of "domesticism" can be observed in the adaptation of general Marxist-Leninist principles to the foreign policies of any communist state. Albania has consistently been more anti-Titoist and "dogmatist" than any other bloc-state, in

large part because of the acute threat to the survival of the present regime posed by the possibility of a bloc-wide rapprochement with Tito. Poland, on the other hand, since 1956 has been more "liberal" or right-wing in its foreign policy orientation because the survival of the Gomulka regime would be facilitated if the international communist movement were more flexible, conceded greater autonomy, and pursued a more differentiated strategy toward the West. In Eastern Europe "domesticism" has never assumed critical proportions because of the proximity of Soviet power and the manner in which most of the communist parties came to power there.

With reference to China, however, in the absence of such restraining factors, the problem of parochialism and of sectionalism has become acute in recent years. The Chinese Communist Party, preoccupied with its own pressing domestic needs and foreign policy frustrations, has called increasingly for more rapid advance at home and abroad and for more revolutionary means with which to achieve these objectives. For the same reasons the Party has revived the Trotskyite concept of "permanent revolution" and has redefined it to suit both Chinese communist aspirations and those of the bloc as interpreted in Peking. The very fact that Khrushchev was concurrently developing a more gradualist bloc-wide strategy both for the transition to communism at home and for the expansion of communism abroad has increasingly frustrated the Chinese communists.

In 1957 the problem began to assume its present proportions, for three major reasons. First, the "native radicals" in China took command of the party and decided that, because the defensive, consolidating, Bandung-spirit strategy was not achieving any of Communist China's foreign policy goals--e.g., the takeover of Taiwan and the elimination of American military power from the western Pacific--it was time to adopt an offensive, left-wing strategy. At the same time, they drastically speeded up the timetable for domestic communist construction via the communes and the great leap forward.[2]

A second immediate cause of the Sino-Soviet dispute was the Soviet sputnik and ICBM successes in the fall of 1957. Determined to move to the left both at home and abroad, the Chinese communists were encouraged by these developments. They saw or pretended to see in them a radical change in the balance of power between East and West which, if properly exploited by the

Russians, could be used as a lever for bringing their objectives closer. The Russians did not share this assessment, or, if they did, were not prepared to act on it as Peking desired.[3] In a more fundamental sense, they probably did not agree with the Chinese assessment because their own frustrations were not so great as Mao's.

Finally, the Chinese demands for a more dynamic bloc-strategy clashed with the alternative course that was being developed in Moscow and had been implicit in Khrushchev's speech to the 20th Congress in 1956. This was a gradualist strategy predicated on the belief that, in view of the exorbitant costs of a thermonuclear war, communism could triumph without risking such a war. The prescription called for a massive build-up of economic power which would be used to wean the underdeveloped countries away from the West and to weaken Western imperialism by depriving it of its sources of key raw materials and of opportunities for the export of capital.[4] It involved also a more flexible foreign policy which no longer condemned all neutrals (e.g., Nehru) as cunning servants of imperialism but instead sought to encourage neutralism. Finally, the gradualist approach envisioned a calculated use of Soviet military power for political purposes. Rocket-rattling became a component of Soviet political strategy.

Both the gradualist right-wing course evolved by the Russians and the militant left-wing strategy urged by Peking since late 1957 are responses to different national revolutionary imperatives. As powerful members of the international community who are at a much more advanced stage of development, are untroubled by "lost territories," and possess a considerable stake in the preservation of their modern industrial society, the Russians are predisposed to view the urgency and costs of revolutionary expansionism in a different frame of reference from that favored by the Chinese.

To place the Sino-Soviet conflict in this perspective is to recognize at once that no amount of papering over, such as occurred at the November 1960 meeting in Moscow, can eliminate the basic causes of the dispute. At the same time, to view the dispute in this perspective is to recognize that there are limits beyond which the Sino-Soviet dispute is unlikely to grow in the near future. The dispute must be viewed as a manifestation of tension between common ideological goals on the one hand and different national revolutionary imperatives on the other.

To put the cohesive and divisive elements of the Sino-Soviet alliance in this framework is to argue that both the bonds and the strains are of a special type. The bonds result first and foremost from a mutual realization that the common revolutionary interests of the two partners can be achieved more easily if they do not drift apart. When Khrushchev says, as he did on January 6, that "our solidarity on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism is the main condition for victory of the working class over imperialism," he is saying and undoubtedly believes that, unless Russia and China stay together, the final victory of communism will be jeopardized.

The strains also are of a special type. They are, as Brzezinski says, a product of disagreement "between two members of an international revolutionary and ideologically oriented movement."[5] To say this is not to minimize the importance of such disagreement. History provides many examples of Christians burning Christians and of democracies fighting democracies. The common revolutionary orientation certainly does not preclude differences, and indeed is often a catalyst in those that do arise. Moreover, some of the strains would undoubtedly exist even if the Russians and Chinese did not belong to the same international revolutionary movement. In analyzing the problem it is therefore important to attempt to separate the differences of a "special" type originating in the common ideology from those differences which may reasonably be attributed to national interest.

The Moscow Conference

Against this background, the following pages will attempt briefly to investigate, first, the November 1960 Moscow conference and, second, the likely future course of Sino-Soviet relations.

The conference of 81 communist parties in Moscow in November-December 1960 was one of the most important international gatherings in communist history. Its purpose was to adjudicate the Sino-Soviet dispute that had been smoldering for several years and had all but broken out into the open in the spring and summer of last year. In April the Chinese had chosen the anniversary of Lenin's birth to launch a violent frontal assault on Khrushchev's international strategy. They charged *inter alia* that Khrushchev was a revisionist who was "emasculating, betraying and revising"

Marxist-Leninist doctrine and that his policies could only lead to disaster for the communist movement. In early June the Chinese had employed the World Federation of Trade Unions meeting in Peking as an occasion for active lobbying against Russian policy. This activity may have been too much for Khrushchev's patience.

The Rumanian party congress in late June was used by the Russians to initiate a counter-offensive against the Chinese within the ranks of the communist movement. It was followed by a mid-July plenum of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which accused the Chinese, without naming them, of "left-wing sectarian deviation" and "manifestations of narrow nationalistic tendencies." Throughout the remainder of the summer and early fall of 1960, there were numerous indications of a rapid and critical deterioration in the Sino-Soviet relationship. It was in this atmosphere that the Moscow conference assembled in an attempt to hammer out a statement of principles that might ease the conflict.

The 81-party declaration issued in Moscow on December 6, 1960, constituted a victory for the Soviet Party on points. It was essentially a Soviet document in the sense that the Soviet grand strategy--aiming at the worldwide triumph of communism without war or high risk of war--remained intact, although the Chinese did succeed in qualifying and hardening certain Soviet theses, in leaving several crucial ones open to varying interpretations and, in general, in nudging the manifesto further to the left than it would have been if drafted by the Russians alone.

The biggest Chinese gains were scored in adding dependent clauses to articles of faith enunciated by the Russians to justify their "go slow" strategy. Thus, the Soviet view that nationalists in the newly independent countries are capable of making further "progress" (and therefore merit continued support) was qualified by the statement that whether they can do so "depends on concrete conditions." Similarly, the Soviet contention that the take-over of power without conflict is becoming increasingly possible and desirable was qualified by the statement that such a possibility also depends on prevailing conditions.

A third important qualification which the Chinese evidently succeeded in introducing was in the paragraph on local wars. While the Chinese have argued that such wars--and not a global

war--are inevitable, the Russians have stressed their ability to forestall wars of all kinds. The manifesto made a bow in both directions. Developments after the conference, however, indicated that the Chinese had forced the Russians to clarify their position on local wars. In his January 6 speech, Khrushchev made an unusual distinction between local wars, or "wars among the states," which, he said, were becoming increasingly preventable, and "national liberation wars," in which people lose patience and "rise in arms." The latter type, he stated, is "not only admissible but inevitable." In this semantic tug of war, the practical issue--and perhaps even the basic one in the polemic--seems to have been the extent to which the communists themselves should seek to exploit revolutionary "opportunities" and the extent to which they should support civil wars once begun. Khrushchev wishes to advance the revolution by indirect means, by subversion from within, rather than risking blatant intervention in a hotly contested area, an action that would almost certainly invite Western counter-intervention. Despite the Laotian case, from which it is difficult to generalize, the Russians are still relatively cautious on this score, and refrain from promises of blanket military support to all embattled "national liberation movements."

If the Chinese succeeded in qualifying important elements in the Soviet strategic line, they failed to establish any of their own principal points--that peaceful coexistence is a mirage; that there is a "middle way" somewhere between hot war and a detente; that local and "liberation" wars will increase in numbers; that the communist bloc must unequivocally lend military support to national independence movements such as the Algerian FLN, even at the risk of local wars with the West; that the newly independent governments in Asia and Africa are unreliable and must soon be overturned; and that the possibilities for peaceful take-over are extremely rare.

The Moscow manifesto is essentially a Soviet document because its overall tone and contents, however qualified, support the Soviet views that the communist bloc has not yet achieved decisive strategic superiority and must therefore move cautiously; that, in any case, time is on the side of the communists; that the economic race will be decisive; that the newly independent countries can be gradually alienated from the West; that the efficacy of violence should not be overestimated; and that the dangers and likely consequences of global war are great.

Whatever the point score on the substantive issues between Moscow and Peking, however, the net effect of the "compromise"

may be interpreted as a grave Russian defeat. From July to September the Russians had marched close to the brink. They had stated publicly that the Chinese must recant their dogmatist errors; they had launched a general propaganda barrage against "dogmatism"; and they had imposed economic sanctions on China. They had shifted the ground from issues of strategy to the basic organizational issue, and had said in effect that, as the ultimate arbiters of bloc strategy, they would brook no interference. In short, Soviet prestige had been heavily engaged, and the Russians had acted as though they would accept nothing short of a Chinese admission of fundamental error. The fact that in the event they did bargain and compromise, and failed to execute any of their most dire threats against Peking, revealed that they had been bluffing.

The Future Pattern of Bargaining

The strategic area that divides Moscow and Peking[6] can be viewed as a battlefield on which the real struggle for hegemony has been raging for several years. The struggle seems likely to continue: the Moscow conference not only failed to blunt the differences between Moscow and Peking; it may have sharpened them.

During the conference, Chinese Vice-Premier Chen I granted an interview in Peking in which he bluntly stated that "Soviet communism has bloomed a Soviet flower and Chinese communism a Chinese one." More important, he clearly implied that the Chinese would not be free from Soviet pressures until they had won economic independence:

> Let me emphasize that Asian, African and Latin American nations have something in common. That is, they have won political independence but not economic independence. Unless we win economic independence, our political independence will be affected. China is no exception to this rule. At present China is independent politically. . . . Unless we win economic independence, we face the danger of losing our political independence. That is why the Chinese people are working hard in unity.[7]

That such a statement could have been made by a Chinese communist spokesman, during the Moscow conference, and to foreign non-communist newspapermen, was indicative of the real state of Sino-Soviet relations.

It is likely that the Russians withdrew most of their economic and technical advisers from China in the fall of 1960. Several articles in the Chinese communist press at that time

stressed Chinese self-sufficiency in polemical terms. The Russians may even have exercised other sanctions. (China is suffering from a severe shortage of petroleum, which is supplied mainly by Russia.) While these sanctions must be seen in perspective, the possibility of a further deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations must not be ignored. What forms are such a deterioration likely to take?

First, however, some general observations about the Sino-Soviet relationship. In a revealing speech after the 1960 Moscow conference, East German Party Secretary Ulbricht strongly implied what had been suspected--that the Chinese were questioning not only Soviet strategy but the very right of the Russians to be the final arbiters of communist dogma and strategy. Ulbricht declared: "there will not be an American, German or Chinese Marxism-Leninism. . . . Somebody has raised the question as to who is the one who determines what is truth, and what complies with the principles of Marxist-Leninist doctrine."

It would be an oversimplification, however, to conclude that the Chinese want to displace the Russians as leaders of the world communist movement. Their present goals are more modest: first, they want the Russians to harden the worldwide strategy and tactics of the communist movement in the manner advocated by Peking; second, they want a genuine partnership in the leadership of the communist world, particularly in the leadership of the revolutionary movement in the underdeveloped countries.

In regard to the first goal, the Russians have moved just far enough to the left to undercut the Chinese criticisms without fundamentally altering their own strategy. These "concessions," like the Moscow declaration of December 1960, will satisfy neither party: the Chinese will increase their demands, and the Russians will refuse to risk war with the West. The bargaining between the two will thus almost surely lead to increasing frustration, mistrust and heat. Only if there is a change in the leadership of one or both parties, or if there is a drastic setback to Khrushchev's strategy, or if negotiations with the new American administration prove less "successful" than expected, will the Russians consider a radical change in strategy.

With regard to the second goal, a larger role for Peking in camp leadership, the Chinese have also achieved only partial success. The Moscow declaration stated that all parties are "independent and have equal rights" and that they are responsible not to the "center" of the movement (the USSR) but to the communist movement as a whole. Moreover, the CPSU is no longer recognized as the leading party but as only the "vanguard."

The principle of accountability to the movement as a whole, however, is a double-edged sword. The Russians will seek to use it to intimidate the Chinese with their "mechanical majority" in the world communist movement. They may agree to the more frequent strategy meetings desired by the Chinese--in order to demonstrate to them that the Chinese are in a small minority. The Chinese, on the other hand, will invoke the principle of accountability to the movement to make the Russians more responsible to the international collective in general and to the Chinese in particular.[8] They may insist that the Russians should defend their strategic initiatives and cold-war tactics before other parties; occasionally they may persuade the Russians to modify plans that in an earlier day the Russians would not have bothered even to discuss with others. Moreover, the Chinese may insist that the Russians should not make any major moves in the cold war without first consulting the international movement. They may remind Khrushchev that he came to Peking only after going to Camp David, and that President Eisenhower consulted with his NATO allies before the Camp David talks. They may insist that no initiatives on Berlin, disarmament or other subjects of importance be taken before a thorough airing in international communist councils.

If the international movement is thus to play a greater role than it has had in recent communist history, a critical question concerns the amount of strength and support that Peking can muster. It would appear that Moscow may no longer have a "mechanical majority" in the international movement and that the international is in fact close to a division between those parties representing the developed and those representing the underdeveloped countries. The chief advocates of the Soviet position remain the European party leaders both inside and outside the communist bloc: Gomulka, Togliatti, Ulbricht. With the notable exception of Albania, which stands as a pointed reminder that the Russians can be defied, the European parties, regardless of the left-right divisions within them or the character of their leaderships, seem firmly under Moscow control.

However, on turning away from Europe, one is immediately struck with the fact that no non-European party has taken a firm stand in support of the Russians. They have either equivocated, like the Japanese; leaned toward Peking, like the Indonesians; or suffered a deep split, like the Indians. Ho Chi-minh has taken up the role of peacemaker. Kim Il-sung has sought to steer a middle course. In Latin America Maoism is reported to be in

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the ascendancy. The simple fact is that Mao's strategy, promising a faster road to power for the parties in the underdeveloped countries, is more appealing than Khrushchev's, which involves a long hard waiting game that will be won only if the Russians win their economic race with the West. It would not be surprising if most of the "revolutionary" communists in these areas were to agree with Mao that Khrushchev is selling them down the river in the interests of Soviet diplomacy.

In the Popular Front era of 1935 and in the Nazi-Soviet Pact days of 1940, the Russians swung from left to right overnight with assurance that they could carry the world communist movement with them, even though it was apparent to all that the local communist parties were being sacrificed to the "higher" interests of Soviet diplomacy. Such freedom of action is no longer possible. The Chinese have become the advocates of the "unwashed," the spokesmen for those intent on building the communism of the poor. If now, when the CPSU still enjoys a preponderance of power in the world communist movement, not one African, Asian or Latin American party unequivocally supports the Russians, what must the situation be in the near future when China has nuclear weapons and the power imbalance with the Russians is much less?

The Chinese are now making their bid to take over the tutelage of the revolutionary movement in the underdeveloped countries. This effort has met with some success. It has forced the Russians to harden their own line in the colonial areas, to begin mending fences with communist parties there, and to try to defend their strategic line. For the time being, Russian power, money and experience may suffice to hold the line against the Chinese challenge--but not indefinitely unless the Russians score significant gains in the underdeveloped countries. If there are more "Iraqs" and "Cubas," Khrushchev will be able to argue that nothing succeeds like success. If, however, the Russians miscalculate the possibility of making further gains, as the Chinese evidently believe they have done, Moscow will find it necessary either to argue for "more time" or to revert to an uncompromising revolutionary position in the colonial areas. If they ask for "more time," they will enhance the Chinese argument and with it Chinese prestige and influence. If, on the other hand, they make a radical shift in strategy, they will in effect be admitting that Khrushchev has all along been as naive as Peking claims.

If the Soviet gradualist strategy fails, the Chinese will present the Russians with a choice of surrendering leadership of the revolution in the underdeveloped areas to Peking or of changing their policy in accord with Chinese demands. Since the Russians cannot be expected quietly to relinquish the keys to the Afro-Asian and Latin American revolutionary movements to Mao, a bitter struggle for power in the communist parties of these areas will ensue. It is already under way.

NOTES

1. For examples of this phenomenon in Eastern Europe immediately after the war and for a detailed elaboration of it, see Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc, Unity and Conflict, pp. 52-58.

2. See A. M. Halpern, "The Foreign Policy Uses of the Chinese Revolutionary Model," RAND Corporation, February 27, 1961; also Roderick McFarquhar, "Communist China's Intra-Party Dispute," Pacific Affairs, December 1958. Mr. McFarquhar argues that the "sloganeers" prevailed over the "pragmatists" in the critical period between June and September 1957.

3. While the Chinese have explicitly claimed that the camp of socialism is now stronger than the West, Khrushchev continues to regard the correlation of forces more cautiously. In his speech of January 6, 1961, he followed the Soviet practice of defining the change in the balance of forces in relative rather than in absolute terms. The balance, he said, had undergone radical changes "in favor of socialism"; he thus purposely left ambiguous the question of which side had absolute superiority. He went on to say that the world socialist system "is becoming" a decisive factor in the development of human society, not that it has already become so. And in the same paragraph he warned that "imperialism still possesses great strength. It possesses a strong military machine." Kommunist, No. 1, 1961.

4. In his post-conference speech Khrushchev said: "The victory of the USSR in economic competition with the United States, the victory of the whole socialist system over the capitalist system, will be the biggest turning point in history, will exert a still more powerful, revolutionizing influence on the workers' movement all over the world. . . . To win time in the economic contest with capitalism is now the main thing." (Emphasis supplied.)

5. Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, "Patterns and Limits of the Sino-Soviet Dispute," Problems of Communism, Vol. 9, No. 5, 1960.

6. For an account of these issues, see the author's "Strains in the Sino-Soviet Alliance," Problems of Communism, May-June 1960, and "Sino-Soviet Frictions in the Underdeveloped Countries," ibid., March-April 1961.

7. Published in the Tokyo Economist, November 21, 1960. (Emphasis supplied.)

8. In post-conference propaganda, Moscow has stressed the importance of adherence to decisions jointly reached, while Peking has attached greater importance to the process of joint decision making, e.g., the need for prior consultation before the Russians undertake a change in the "general line."

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POLITICAL REALITIES IN VIETNAM

Wesley R. Fishel

THE ABORTIVE REBELLION in Saigon last November, coming on the heels of a military coup in neighboring Laos, focused worldwide attention on the political situation in the Southeast Asian republic. Interest was especially high in the United States, which has given approximately $1.3 billion in aid to Vietnam since 1954 and is committed to come to its defense in the event of a Communist invasion. American press coverage of the uprising indicated considerable American sympathy with the rebels and a readiness to accept a denouement that would have seen President Ngo Dinh Diem and his government ousted. Another current of opinion, however, while uneasy about certain aspects of the Ngo Government, was dissatisfied with the rebel alternative. These contradictory expressions suggest the dilemma of many observers in analyzing the development of the Republic of Vietnam during its five years of existence.

It is well known that Ngo Dinh Diem and his colleagues surmounted grave obstacles in neutralizing the challenges to their power from dissident private armies and in developing a degree of national unity in the face of strong traditional village and regional ties in the non-Communist remnant of the former State of Vietnam. It is also a matter of record that his regime effectively eliminated the last vestiges of French colonialism from the country and made many basic changes in its social, economic and political life. Why, then, should American observers have feelings of uneasiness? Why should anyone have attempted to overthrow this constructive nationalist government? The answers to these questions are several and complex. They lie in the quality of political leadership in the Republic of Vietnam, in the character of political opposition, and in the nature of men's expectations.

There are two salient facts that influence politics in South Vietnam today. One is the violent subversive activity of the Communists. The other is the Republic's achievements in the economic and social fields. Much journalistic attention has been directed to the presence or absence of civil liberties in Vietnam. Similarly, the story of the successful absorption of

860,000 refugees from the Communist north has been retold countless times. However, the absence of a runaway inflation, the continuous and striking rise in the production of rice, rubber and various new crops, the increase in general wage and salary levels, the creation of a new class of small landowners, and the growth of peasant income have received relatively little notice.

Prices in Vietnam have been stabilized since 1956, and in consequence so has the cost of living. The population lives better now than it did in 1955, even though fewer consumer goods are imported than previously. The grave excess of imports over exports that existed in 1954 after eight years of civil war is not yet fully corrected, nor is it reasonable to expect that it will be for many years. However, major advances have been recorded in rice production and exportation, rubber production, and the development of new industrial crops such as kenaf, jute, ramie and cotton. Modest industrial development is taking place. This is not to suggest that Vietnam has solved its basic economic problems, but rather that it has made significant economic progress.

In the realm of social welfare, Vietnam's record compares very favorably with those of other newly independent nations. Take land reform, for example, often regarded as the hallmark of a progressive regime in Asia. In the face of increasingly violent Communist efforts to block and undermine the program, the Vietnamese government has persevered in its efforts to carry out a massive redistribution of rice lands. When the program is completed this year, more than 1,500,000 peasants will have benefited from it.[1]

Parallel with the agrarian reform have been programs designed to raise living levels in the rural areas, where 88 per cent of the Republic's 14,000,000 citizens live, and to ameliorate some of the hitherto endemic problems of the peasants. For example, the government-sponsored national agricultural credit program has been efficiently managed and extremely effective. A five-year malaria-eradication program is already half-completed. Training programs for teachers, midwives, medical technicians, nurses, tractor drivers, and mechanics have created thousands of newly skilled workers. Roads and canals have been constructed speedily to link the thousands of towns, villages and hamlets for the first time in history. Viewed separately, these accomplishments are not spectacular; in sum, however, they represent rural social change on a major scale.

Perhaps the factor of change is best illustrated by two bold programs undertaken by the Ngo regime on a "crash" basis: the land-development centers and the agrovilles. The former, located primarily in the plateau regions, represent the government's approach to four basic concerns: overcrowding in the infertile coastal plains of Annam; exploitation of virgin upland soil; national security; and the introduction of new industrial crops to conserve foreign exchange. Life in the new settlements, located along the desolate and vulnerable frontiers with Laos and Cambodia, has not been easy, but the land is fertile and crops have been good. The 200,000 settlers are today counted as loyal and productive citizens.[2]

The fertile rice lands of the Mekong delta have presented somewhat different problems. The region is thinly settled; farms are scattered throughout the area; communications are grossly inadequate; contact between isolated peasants and their government is infrequent and unsatisfying. This has been the target area for most Communist terrorism during the past three years, with the efforts steadily increasing in tempo and intensity. Villages have been victimized, "taxes" collected, agents placed, communications disrupted, tractors, bulldozers and barges blown up. During 1960 at least 1,200 civilians (including local officials) and more than 1,600 soldiers and police were killed in encounters with Viet Cong (Communist) forces. Communist units, fully armed and well supplied from North Vietnam, have infiltrated the country through the sparsely populated jungles of southern Laos, and, in bands of 50 to 200 men, have operated in guerilla fashion against the Vietnamese National Army and Civil Guard. (Communist losses in 1960 are estimated at 6,800 killed in action.[3])

Peasant support for the Saigon government has declined as a result of continued Communist depredations. Some observers report that the mass of the people is politically indifferent, though anti-Communist. What has seemed clear is that after 90 years of colonial domination and eight years of civil war, the Vietnamese peasant's goals generally are security, enough money to sustain his family, and a plot of land. The administration in Saigon has been able to assure the latter two requisites, but it has not been able to provide armed protection for every isolated farm and every lone traveler, and it is reliably estimated that 10,000 armed Communists are now operating in the delta region and in the zone stretching from the Laotian frontier to the sea, east of Saigon.[4]

To meet the challenge of insecurity and the political problems it poses, President Ngo has essayed an imaginative non-military approach. Late in 1959 the government began to build agrovilles--rural towns--at strategic locations throughout the southern part of the Republic. The first, at Vi Thanh, was completed and its population installed on March 12, 1960. By late September, 15 such towns had been established. Like the centers in the plateau, the agrovilles provide their peasant inhabitants with schools, clinics, markets, social centers, technical and financial aid, electricity and, above all, security. However, much peasant resentment was incurred during the process of regroupment as a result of rigid, clumsy implementation of presidential directives by ambitious and insensitive local administrators who coerced peasants into construction work on the new settlements at harvest time, and otherwise showed ineptness in dealing with those who should have been satisfied beneficiaries of a forward-looking policy. Recent visitors to the agrovilles report that the manifest advantages of the new settlements have overcome the initial unhappiness, however, and an additional evidence of success is seen in the fact that the Communists have not yet ventured to attack an agroville.

THE splitting of the Vietnamese portion of Indochina in 1954 augured ill for the administration in the French-sponsored southern half, the assumption being that within two years it would follow the northern half of the country into the Communist camp. Ngo Dinh Diem was regarded as having taken on an impossible task. As the prime minister with the impassive face and shy manner bested one after another of his adversaries, feelings of futility and fatalism among observers changed to incredulity and then to hope. A national referendum in October 1955 legalized the ouster of Bao Dai and the establishment of a republic, with Ngo Dinh Diem as its first president. Democratic phrases punctuated the speeches of virtually every public figure in the country; a Constitution was promulgated and a National Assembly elected; a buoyant revolutionary spirit swept the country. Abroad as well, hopes rose, and republican Vietnam's allies found the outlook suddenly brighter.

However, expectations that the end of colonialism would bring immediate democracy were unrealistic. Ngo Dinh Diem was indeed a revolutionary, but a cautious one. He was strong-willed and determined, and convinced of the righteousness of his cause. After years of underground intrigues he was suspicious of strangers,

distrustful of anyone whose attitudes (and antecedents) he did not know thoroughly. He relied for advice on those whom he knew to be trustworthy: his family and a few intimate friends. The result was a tight group of leaders, who looked inward rather than outward for guidance and support. During the tense weeks of 1954-55 many in the inner circle, increasingly discouraged about the possibility of overcoming the "feudalistic" sects (the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao) and the Binh Xuyen gang, urged formation of a "government of national union." But the premier, his brothers, and a handful of associates rejected the idea of union with such elements, and the dissenters were dropped from the administration.

Yet the men who broke with Ngo were nationalists and believed that compromise was the only way of avoiding disaster. Still other nationalists were never taken into the government, either because they were considered too ambitious or were hostile to the Ngo family, or because they set too high a price on their cooperation. Dr. Phan Quang Dan, who came forward as a leader in the recent uprising, was regarded as falling into all three categories, and when he and Ngo Dinh Diem were unable to agree on terms for his joining the cabinet, he became a prominent member of the opposition.

The non-Communist "opposition" in the Republic of Vietnam is usually considered to comprise the intellectuals and the educated youth, who voice their dissatisfaction with the existing state of things. If this categorizing is correct, the opposition must number relatively few people. There are only a few thousand intellectuals in Vietnam, including the lawyers, pharmacists, doctors, engineers, teachers, small businessmen and non-professional university graduates. Most live in the Saigon metropolitan area. Moreover, in the writer's opinion, the majority of educated Vietnamese who hold government positions, including most of the army officers, should not be counted among the intellectual opposition. In many Saigon offices they are aware of a lack of dynamic leadership and revolutionary impulsion, and their support for the regime is often only half-hearted, but this lack of fervor is not equivalent to active opposition.

The numerical strength and economic weight of the intellectuals is probably quite inferior to that of the Chinese community in Saigon-Cholon, whose dissatisfactions and grievances, however, very few Vietnamese critics share. Furthermore, the Saigon-centered intellectual oppositionists have thus far shown little evident interest in the problems of land tenancy and land reform, or

in social welfare measures in general. One might infer therefore that their interests are not always identical with those of the mass of the people.

The difference between a country such as Vietnam and an "advanced" Western country must not be overlooked. Many advanced countries possess traditions of democracy, institutions for democratic controls, responsible, broadly based opposition parties, general literacy and participation in political life. Such conditions do not prevail in most "underdeveloped" countries.[5] The mass of the people in a country like Vietnam cannot be vitally concerned with freedom of the press if they see no newspaper from the day of their birth to the moment of their death. Improvements in their lot must come through governmental action, which suggests that for the Vietnamese rural population effective and competent administration is infinitely more important than a "liberal" administration.

And yet, most observers contend that Vietnam's leaders have too inflexibly restricted the areas of freedom. It is in some measure because of this rigidity that the regime has failed to enlist the active cooperation of the intellectuals in Vietnam, other than those directly involved in the business of government. However, given the obvious necessity for countering insurrection with a firm hand, and given also the demonstrated factionalist attitudes and activities of the majority of the intellectuals, whether they could be induced to support any regime may be seriously questioned.

THE coup of November 10, 1960, was managed by a small group of middle-level army officers in collaboration with a scattering of oppositionist politicians. During the 36 hours before the last rebel paratroop units surrendered, the insurgents grappled with the problems of mounting a coup d'état, such as the evidently unanticipated canniness of President Ngo Dinh Diem, blockaded inside the palace, and the fact that the other 98 per cent of the armed forces, plus the entire police force, remained loyal. Furthermore, neither the civilian "opposition" nor the general public joined in the uprising. But even as the revolt failed, there were dark suggestions that it would not be the last. In the five years since the establishment of the republic, President Ngo had accomplished much in the way of fundamental change and material progress for his people. And yet, quiet, reserved and undramatic leader that he is, he had not succeeded

in the basic task of developing strong popular support for and recognition of the achievements of his regime.

The leaders of the coup publicly justified their action by stating that they intended to strengthen, liberalize and cleanse the government, which they accused of nepotism and of inefficiency in the fight against the Communists. The government's reaction to the charge of nepotism was to point out that the projected rebel government would merely have substituted another family for the one currently in power. As a matter of fact, it would be hard under present circumstances to find competent leaders who would not bring relatives into the government. This state of affairs is due to the size of Vietnamese families, the strength of family ties and the fact that education--and therefore qualification for public office--is found only in relatively few persons belonging to a small number of formerly privileged families whose members had the good fortune to receive an education under the colonial regime. The question, then, is not whether an uncle in the government has nephews in high positions, but whether the nephews are qualified. A family such as the Ngo--aristocratic, cultured, prominent and talented--would have members in official positions under any open regime. And in the restricted society that prevails, these persons have status and power by virtue of their kinship and loyalty as well as their ability.

Although the president himself is the only member of his immediate family to hold an official position in the government, two of his brothers, Ngo Dinh Can and Ngo Dinh Nhu, who wield much informal political power, have frequently been accused of corruption, as has Nhu's wife, a member of the National Assembly. Such charges have been investigated, but no evidence has yet been advanced to persuade impartial observers that any of the family has been personally enriched through his position. The unofficial status of Nhu and Can nevertheless gives rise to gossip and lends credence to accusations of their abuse of power. If such criticisms are difficult to assess objectively, there is no denying that the very existence of such family relationships at the center of power inevitably creates uneasiness and distrust, and thereby increases the vulnerability of the regime. Certainly the November conspirators believed that hostility toward the reputedly excessive political power of members of the president's family was exploitable.

At the time, many critics voiced the hope that the revolt would alert the regime to the unrest in the country and that a

measure of reform, including some relaxation of restrictions on political activity, would result. At this writing, the Saigon administration has announced certain initial reforms. For one, village youth will henceforth be represented on village councils by elected councilors. This move is said to be a first step toward holding popular elections for the village councils as a whole. Second, 14 of the 20 agencies attached to the president's office are to be transferred to appropriate cabinet departments. Third, to strengthen coordination and control of governmental activities, various departments will be grouped under Coordinating Secretaries of State (specifically, for economic development, security, and cultural and social affairs).[6] And the Secretary of the Interior, charged with provincial administration, announced at a press conference that the government was going to take "new drastic measures against civil servants found guilty of abuse of power, brutality, or vexation toward the population; they will be mercilessly punished and immediately suspended."[7]

Despite the insecure conditions in parts of the southern provinces, President Ngo has ordered that presidential elections be held as prescribed in the Constitution. Accordingly, on April 9, 1961, voters throughout the country will choose their chief executive and vice-president. President Ngo and the vice-president, Nguyen Ngoc Tho, are running for re-election, and the odds heavily favor them over two sets of opponents: Nguyen Dinh Quat, a wealthy Saigon businessman and rubber planter, teamed with Nguyen Thanh Phuong, former commander of the armies of the Cao Dai; and Ho Nhat Tan, a doctor of Oriental medicine, whose running mate is Nguyen The Truyen, an outspoken nationalist opponent of the present regime.

This election will constitute a major challenge for the Saigon government. The campaign and the balloting, which are being supervised by a committee representing the various candidates, will be scrutinized closely for indications of democratic (or undemocratic) conduct on the part of the regime, for what they may reveal of Ngo Dinh Diem's popular strength, for what they may show about the extent of discontent in the country, and for evidence of the effectiveness of a threatened Viet Cong effort to keep the peasants from the polls. The Ngo Government has gone far toward translating the independence gained in 1955 into a better life for the people of the truncated nation. The April election, an important exercise in the mechanics of representative government, will test the regime's avowed intent to

take the people of Vietnam down the road toward an eventual democratic system.

NOTES

1. See John T. Dorsey, Jr., "South Vietnam in Perspective," Far Eastern Survey, December 1958; J. Price Gittinger, "Progress in South Vietnam's Agrarian Reform," ibid., January 1960 (I) and February (II).

2. See Wolf I. Ladejinsky, "Vietnam: The First Five Years," The Reporter, December 24, 1959; Wesley R. Fishel, "Vietnam's War of Attrition," The New Leader, December 7, 1959.

3. Private communication to the writer.

4. Private communication to the writer.

5. An able, general analysis of these aspects of political development is that of Edward Shils, "Political Development in the New States," Comparative Studies in Society and History, April 1960, pages 265-92.

6. Vietnam Press, February 7, 1961 (Morning), H.1-H.7.

7. The Times of Vietnam, February 8 and 21, 1961, reported the discharge of two district chiefs for "abuse of power" and "maladministration."

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SECOND THOUGHTS ON ASIAN DEMOCRACY

Richard L. Park

RESPONSIBLE LEADERS in Asia are concerned that the democratic institutions and ideals to which they were devoted during the fight for independence may prove inadequate to fulfil public expectations in the crucial years of nation building. Second thoughts indeed are in order. Military rule, authoritarian tendencies of the political leadership and in administration, compounded by demagoguery, nepotism, corruption and apathy, have been more the rule than the exception in the region in recent years. The communist overthrow of the Republic in China in 1949 and the rapid rise of Chinese military and economic strength on mainland Asia have posed competitive ideological and power threats to the newly independent Asian countries that cannot be ignored. It is not given to these new states to experiment slowly and cautiously. The compulsions urging rapid economic growth and demanding national unity and loyalty press for results, and a variety of totalitarian techniques to achieve short-term goals await adoption if democratic institutions falter. The flag of Asian democracy is at half mast these days at best.

In these circumstances, the seminar on "South and South-East Asia Has a Second Look at Democracy," held in New Delhi, India, from February 1 to 8, 1961, takes on special significance. The conference was sponsored by the Congress for Cultural Freedom, in conjunction with the Indian Institute of Public Administration, and was attended by 28 politicians, administrators, journalists, and scholars, mostly from the countries of South and Southeast Asia. This seminar was the latest of five conducted under the auspices of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, the first of which met in Rhodes, Greece, in 1958.

Many of those attending the New Delhi seminar were of democratic socialist persuasion, such as Asoka Mehta and Jayaprakash Narayan of India, U Kyaw Nyein of Burma, and S. Soedjatmoko of Indonesia. Others were of more conservative outlook, such as Kiichi Miyazawa of Japan, Hatim Alavi of Pakistan, and Raul Manglapus of the Philippines. Dr. N. M. Perera of Ceylon represented a more extreme left-wing perspective, but his views were supported on many occasions by others of different ideological convictions. The Asian countries represented included Burma,

Ceylon, Indonesia, Japan, Pakistan, the Philippines, (South) Vietnam, Singapore, Thailand, Malaya, and India, with delegates invited also from France (Bertrand de Jouvenel), England (W. H. Morris-Jones), Lebanon (René Aggiouri), and the United States (Selig S. Harrison, Richard L. Park, and Edward Shils). Communist delegates were not invited, for obvious reasons.

The sessions were held in camera, and no members of the press were admitted. However, a tape-recorded record was made, and stenographers took verbatim notes. A book-of-record will appear in due course, edited by one of the members of the seminar's Steering Committee, Dr. V. K. N. Menon (Director of the Indian Institute of Public Administration). The proceedings will reproduce the basic working paper, certain background reports on various Asian countries, and will include an edited version of the debates in which the speakers will not be identified. The proceedings will reflect the themes of emphasis: a review of the contemporary political situation in Asia, with special attention to the fate of democratic governments state-by-state; some discussion of the meaning of "democracy"; elections, political parties, and political leadership; public administration; economic development and political thought; and the social implications of democracy.

Much of greatest value in the seminar, however, will remain in the private possession of the participants, since it cannot be expected that all of the exceedingly frank, self-critical discussion will be exposed in print. Properly much of the debate should remain exclusive. In the last analysis, the seminar was intended to give a few persons an opportunity for personal exploration in the sensitive realm of political conviction. The seminar's objective, if it is met, will be enacted eventually in the politics of the countries represented; the printed proceedings constitute a fringe benefit.

CONSIDERING the importance of the conference, it is disappointing to have to report that much of the discussion flowed along routine lines of academic quality or below. The attempt was made to take up topics on a functional rather than on a country-by-country basis; this attempt tended to produce broadly generalized statements that then were challenged, country by country, with a spate of exceptions. This conference, like others before, showed all too clearly the non-existence of a mutually intelligible, specific body of data on Asian government and politics held in the minds of leading men in Asia's public life. Many of the examples used for comparative purposes were selected from that European experience with which the particular delegate was

most familiar. Only gingerly and with due deference to nationals present were comparisons within Asia cited. The implications for educational and research policies of this absence of detailed, systematic knowledge of one's neighbors in Asia should be self-evident.

All of the delegates accepted the democratic ideal as the one towards which they felt their own people should strive. But "democracy," in this context, was pictured in many forms--a broad enough frame to include "tutelage in," "training for," and "guiding towards" formulas of authoritarian rule. The absence of responsible party systems, the paucity of political leadership, illiteracy, poverty, disease, and "backward" social traditions were listed among the obstacles to the immediate achievement of an open society with competitively democratic objectives. As the obstacles were listed and as the definition of democracy was widened to encompass some of its enemies, the gulf between ideals and realities in Asian politics became more evident. It is important to note, at the same time, that a high ideal remained dominant in the thinking of the delegates, even if compromises of the ideal were admitted under the pressure of given local "realities."

To one observer, the seminar failed to sharpen many of the crucial issues relating to democracy in Asia because no thorough review of the development of patterns of political thought in Asia was undertaken. Such a review could have posed the nature of the uneasy balance existing between traditional and modern ideals of government resulting from the intermixture of Asian and Western thought and institutions over the past two centuries. Although most of the delegates affirmed their general faith in the ideal, detailed discussions on the workings of political institutions, on the means for reaching economic goals, and on techniques for achieving greater measures of administrative efficiency revealed a weak theoretical democratic frame that led in the discussion occasionally to an easy acceptance of short-cutting policies of a strictly anti-democratic character. Most critical in this regard was the excessive weight given to the scale of achievement reached in economic growth used as the primary criterion for judging the acceptability of political forms and norms. Many of the delegates appeared to be more at home when economic development was on the agenda than when politics and philosophy were the order of business. This is understandable, but none the less disturbing as far as the future of political democracy in Asia is concerned.

On the problem of turning over more local power to the rural citizenry in Asia, the journalists, academics and administrators

were far more cautious (sometimes even blatantly reluctant) than were the active politicians. Indeed, this reporter was accused of lacking faith in the people and in the spirit of local self-government (allegedly at the foundation of American democracy) when he suggested caution in executing the transfer of power from upper-level to village institutions. It appears that politicians in Asia are as far removed from the academic literature on local social and political conditions in their countries as are their political counterparts in other parts of the world. Field-experienced, empirically informed sociologists and anthropologists were not present at this seminar; politicians' rough and unsystematic rural observations were poor substitutes for the available scientific observation and analysis.

The New Delhi seminar, despite all of its weaknesses, was a valuable private forum for the discussion of some of the most crucial political and economic problems of our times. The meetings were conducted in a cordial and dignified atmosphere in which candid analysis and constructive criticism predominated. The Chairman, C. D. Deshmukh (former Minister of Finance and former head of the Universities Grants Commission in India), deserves much credit for his deft steering of this group of prima donnas. The Steering Committee (Asoka Mehta, M.P., Dr. P. S. Lokanathan, Dr. A. Appadorai, and Professor V. K. N. Menon--all of India) deserve credit for having taken the initiative in convening the meetings. It is to be hoped that this seminar will mark only the first step in a many-staged intellectual discourse among leaders in Asia that will give added strength to the growth of a democratic tradition which most certainly is in jeopardy in much of Asia today.

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THE LANGUAGE PROBLEM IN SOUTH ASIAN STUDIES

John J. Gumperz

THE PUBLIC AWAKENING, after sputnik and The Ugly American, to the need for training Americans in non-Western tongues is beginning to show results. The National Defense Education Act of 1958 provides for training centers in the previously neglected languages and areas. South Asia has received priority under this program and the result is that the number of universities offering regular instruction in Hindi-Urdu, for example, increased from two in 1955 to eight in 1960. It is expected, furthermore, that about two hundred fellowships will be awarded this year to students in the humanities and social sciences for study in these institutions.

Despite this enormous increase in training facilities, South Asia area specialists themselves by no means agree on the extent to which a knowledge of the vernaculars is really necessary. In contrast to the fields of China and Japan studies, where no one seriously questions the fact that language competence is a prerequisite for serious research, South Asian area programs have for a long time operated without proper language-training facilities. Only a small minority of the thousands of Americans who lived on the Indian sub-continent for periods of up to several years can boast a working knowledge of a local tongue. Moreover, relatively few American scholars regularly use the vernaculars in their own research.

A recent national conference on the "Strengthening and Integration of South Asian Language and Area Studies," while generally favoring improved language instruction as a means of providing a better overall area background, produced little agreement on the relation of language training to the various academic and professional disciplines. It was argued that many aspects of South Asia studies do not require special linguistic background. There is a wealth of English source materials in such fields as economics, politics, and history which will provide scope for research for many years to come.

The conferees further pointed to the inherent conflict between special language and area studies and the requirements set by the more established disciplines. This conflict results in serious loss of time for any student desiring adequate training

in both. Disciplinary training, furthermore, enjoys the highest prestige. Insufficient language and area background seldom stands in the way of obtaining a good position. The conference recommended special financial inducements to persuade competent personnel to acquire more language and area training.

Such conclusions on the part of authorities in the field do not bode well for the future of our newly created training facilities. If the authorities themselves do not agree on the place of language in the academic framework, clearly students will not cheerfully make the considerable investment in time required for reasonable language competence. The situation in fact bears further analysis.

IN recent years we have considerably refined our understanding of the complexities of social systems. Our views on the place of language in these systems, however, have remained essentially unchanged. The reason for this lies at least partially in our own linguistic background. We live in a monolingual society. Although in this society there exist important linguistic differences of a regional, social and stylistic nature, these do not present any significant barrier to internal communications. In fact, they are rarely studied by modern social scientists. Thus we do research on "communication of ideas," "value systems," "attitudes" and the like without reference to the linguistic code in which relevant concepts are expressed.

We also naturally tend to see other societies as homogeneous linguistic units. The countries best known to us, such as France, Germany, and even to some extent Japan, all represent this model. Our model fails us, however, when we are confronted with multilingual speech communities such as those in India. There we see on the one hand that English has been the prestige language for more than one hundred years. We find an abundance of English sources in all fields of endeavor, scientific as well as literary. Although there is talk of a change-over to the vernaculars, we see few signs of this at present.

On the level of the local languages, on the other hand, we are faced with a bewildering array of language names. In addition to the 14 regional languages there are more than a hundred dialects, tribal languages, literary styles, and the like. We encounter conflicting claims of importance. Hindi has the largest number of speakers, but it comes after Bengali, Marathi, and possibly Tamil, in literary importance. Literary sources in

most languages go back to the middle ages, and many writings such as the Ramayana of Tulsidas are universally recognized as classics. But most of the local literature is, as yet, unanalyzed. Good text editions are rarely available, and modern traditions of impartial literary criticism have, as yet, made little headway. Few Indians control more than one or two local languages, and Indian writers in English rarely rely on local language sources.

Armed with our monolingual model, we tend to visualize this kind of variety geographically in terms of an aggregate of distinct monolingual units. We fail to perceive that India's linguistic diversity arises from its peculiar social structure. The differences between the Indian linguistic picture and our American one are at least in part analogous to those between our own relatively fluid class structure and the rigid kin and occupational groupings of a caste society. Activities that in our society are performed by one person are divided in India among several distinct groups. Our farmers do their own plowing, weeding, harvesting, mend their own fences, keep their homes in repair, etc. In India, equivalent activities are the hereditary domain of different groups. Similarly, we conceive of the entire body of writing and speech labeled English, as a whole. In India, aside from regional differences, there are in each locality ordinarily not one but several functionally distinct languages and styles. The daily round of linguistic activity is thus segmented. Whereas English serves as the language of science and administration and polite intercourse on certain social levels, one regional language may be used for epic poetry, another may serve for lyric poetry, another again for prose and administration. Furthermore, the language of the home is usually a local dialect distinct from all formal styles.

These languages and styles form a functional whole. By isolating English from this whole and studying it to the exclusion of other languages and styles, we are, in fact, studying it out of context. An Indian may write in English on constitutional law or economic development, but his ideas and the symbols by which they are expressed will be influenced, however unconsciously, by the vernacular literature he reads. Indian English when judged by our own standards often seems to us unnecessarily flowery, cumbersome and redundant. This is not so if we judge it within the framework of the local speech community.

Similarly, although much writing in the local languages is based on English sources, we should not dismiss it as mere translation. It is more likely to be a readaptation clothed in different concepts and symbols, directed at a different circle of readers, and thus of some intrinsic interest to the social scientist.

The availability of research material significant to a particular discipline as a precondition for language study thus becomes irrelevant. If we want to understand South Asians in their own terms, we must know their total linguistic environment, and for this the local languages are necessary.

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COMMUNIST CHINA -- THE PROBLEM BEFORE US

George E. Taylor

IT WAS NOT until the Soviet Union was nearly thirty years old that the United States made a serious effort to study this communist society in action. Even today the number of trained men and women, either in the government or in the academic world, who are spending most of their professional effort on the study of Soviet society and foreign policy is very limited. It would be possible to mobilize much more expert knowledge from the academic world for an evaluation of our main European allies than for our main adversary.

The first ten years of Communist China have had little more impact on American scholarship than did the first ten years of the Soviet Union. There has been a curious reluctance to undertake theoretical studies of Communist China, whether on the part of those scholars who had the tools and were already committed to the China field or on the part of the younger scholars who were in a position to undertake the necessary training. The reasons for this state of affairs are to be found, perhaps, in the normal time lag which major shifts in the contours of academic interest require, the relatively underdeveloped condition of Chinese studies before 1949, the unfavorable political climate in domestic American politics, and the fact that mainland China has been closed to Americans.

Whatever the reasons, it is only in the last year that organized efforts have been made in American universities to focus attention on the serious study of Communist China. Most of the universities that have had some experience in Chinese and/or Soviet studies are now directing a good deal of thought and attention to this problem. The Social Science Research Council and the American Council of Learned Societies have set up a Joint Committee on Studies of Contemporary China, and the private Foundations seem willing to assist. It is high time.

The years which have been largely wasted as far as basic research is concerned have at least produced some results in the way of materials. Various branches of the United States Government and some universities have systematically acquired most of the newspaper, book and periodical output of Communist China, and much of it is regularly translated. Some serious work has been done on the basis of this wealth of material, a

good deal of quick analysis based on the translated portions alone. Whatever the problems of access and distribution with regard to materials on Communist China, there is little to complain about regarding their quantity, except for the usual gaps in the publications of any communist society. On the contrary, one of the problems we have to face is that of finding ways to arrange the vast amount of available material in both Chinese and English in usable form. Shall we index the ten years' accumulation we already have on hand and then index future materials at regular intervals? Is our need for more translations, or for more scholars from a variety of disciplines to be trained in Chinese language and area studies?

The main problem, however, is a conceptual one. We have a new kind of society to comprehend and, until its main outlines are identified, most of our work will be superficial or pure fact-gathering. There are not many landmarks to guide us. If the spread of communism could be usefully compared with the spread of industrialization, this would help, but the comparison is misleading. Both the Russian and Chinese communists are attempting to reshape their respective traditional societies; but these could hardly differ more in politics, ideology and social organization. The influence of traditional society on communism is specific, and perhaps unique, in each country. This makes doctrinal unity--an essential ingredient of the communist movement--all the more difficult for the Russian and Chinese parties to achieve, or for us to comprehend.

It is clear that the price of basic research on Chinese communism is much higher now than it was at the beginning of the decade, for Communist China can be understood properly only in the context of the whole communist orbit. The quality of our basic research on the Soviet Union will therefore be very relevant to our studies of Communist China. Old concepts of the state, of the nation, of international relations and alliances, must be modified if not discarded. What is the role of nationalism in the communist orbit? Hardly the same as that in the free world. What will be the impact of industrialization on a totalitarian political system? Those who argue that it will lead to freer discussion, the lessening of terror as a method of control, and the steady expansion of political responsibility, are often those who claim that it is having the opposite effect in the United States.

Ten years of Communist China have intensified the need for basic research on communism; they have also intensified the need for academic study of the so-called underdeveloped countries

of the world. The scholar rightly feels a responsibility for making a contribution to the understanding of societies that are politically important because of the threat of communist imperialism, but this is not the most important aspect of the matter. We have to study the traditional societies of Asia, whether they are under communist control or not, in order to understand what is happening to those that are within the communist orbit. The events of 1949 in China came at a time when basic research on Asian societies was in its infancy, and the mere fact that communists are trying to remake traditional societies is no reason for abandoning our interest in them. On the contrary, in order to evaluate the course of communism in China, it is as important to intensify our research on the free and unfree societies of Asia as to continue our studies of communism in Russia.

It is, therefore, no wonder that communist societies are difficult to understand and that scholars shy away from the effort. To say that basic research in this field calls for the application of all our various academic disciplines is only part of the truth. The problem before us is a challenge to our whole sociology of knowledge; it drives to the roots of all our values and academic traditions. It is a challenge which we have hardly yet accepted in the China field and only partially in the Russian.

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